‘Canaries in the Mine’
“Short-sellers are often the canaries in the mine. Both Enron and Tyco were favored by shortsellers long before the accounting irregularities at each became public. However, their view that a company’s shares will decline puts them in a naturally adversarial position towards company management.”
Financial Times, July 22, 2008 (40)

Investors’ ‘Heroes’
“The short sellers have been the heroes of the past few years, alerting the public and the authorities to corporate fraud. And it has been the hedge funds which have simultaneously preserved investor capital and corrected mispricing.”
Professor Owen A. Lamont, Yale University, June 28, 2006 (41)

Antidote to ‘Overly
Optimistic’ CEO’s

“Managements tend to be overly optimistic. They tend to put out good information and deny bad information. And we need short selling to have a fair, objective, unbiased market.”
Professor John Coffee, Columbia University, July 18, 2008 (42)

‘First Line of Defense’
“Short sellers are our first line of defense against securities manipulators who would pump and dump worthless securities. It is important that the stock lending market work efficiently in order for the short sellers to be able to do their job. By preventing fraudulent manipulators from hyping overpriced stocks to the stratosphere, they can prevent investors from buying overpriced stocks.”
Professor James J. Angel, Georgetown University, August 15, 2008 (43)

Groundless Complaints

The Louder the Complaints against Short Sellers, the More Investors Should be Concerned

When a company’s share price falls, senior management may blame short sellers for the decline and allege illegal trading activities.

Short selling allows one to communicate less optimistic expectations to others. “Firms don’t like it when someone shorts their stock, and some firms try to impede short selling using legal threats, investigations, lawsuits, and various technical actions,” said Yale university Finance Professor Owen A. Lamont in June 28, 2006 testimony before the Senate Judiciary committee. (35)

“Consistent with the hypothesis that short sale constraints allow stocks to be overpriced, firms taking these anti-shorting actions have in the subsequent year experienced very low abnormal returns of about 24 percent per year. The negative returns continue for up to three years. What appears to be happening is that these companies are overpriced, either because of excessively optimistic investor expectations, faulty products or business plans, or just plain fraud on the part of management.”

Lamont looked at long-term returns for 270 firms who threatened, took action against, or accused short sellers of illegal activity or false statements.(36) “The evidence is strongly consistent with the idea that short sale constraints allow very substantial overpricing, and that this overpricing gets corrected only slowly over many months,” he told the senate panel.

“Aggregate short selling tends to increase in bear markets, which perhaps makes it all the easier for people to blame the messenger,” according to a paper by Lamont and Harvard Professor Jeremy C. Stein. They see the problem as “not too much short selling in falling markets” (volume of short interest is very small compared to total share volume) but rather as too “little in rising markets.” In their view, “any regulatory efforts to constrain short selling are likely to be misguided.” (37)

In 2001, Enron, once the seventh largest US company, collapsed into bankruptcy. About one year before its demise, some investors began shorting the stock after determining that the company was using accounting methods to overstate earnings. Cryptic financial disclosures were additional alarms. Short sellers’ independent research and resolve allowed them to position their clients to avert losses that other investors suffered by holding the stock too long.

The traditional watchdogs failed in their job of protecting investors in Enron. as an exhaustive staff report of the senate governmental affairs committee found, “Despite the magnitude of Enron’s implosion and the apparent pervasiveness of its fraudulent conduct, virtually no one in the multilayered system of controls devised to protect the public detected Enron’s problems, or if they did, they did nothing to correct them or alert investors.”(38)

Other examples of short sellers’ prescience include Adelphia, Boston Chicken, Baldwin United, Conseco, Global Crossing, Sunbeam Corporation, Tyco, and Worldcom. These were companies whose fundamentals were scrutinized by professional investors and found to be inadequate to support their market valuation and management’s pronouncements.

Britain’s Regulator Drops Investigation in 2008

On March 19, 2008, shares of the Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) — a banking and insurance group that is the largest mortgage lender in the United Kingdom — fell 17 percent. That sudden drop prompted the U.K. Financial Services Authority (FSA) to investigate charges of potential trading-regulation violations by short sellers.

By August 2008, the FSA had dropped its investigation, concluding that no action could be brought despite a wide-ranging probe examining thousands of emails and telephone records.(39) The FSA said it “has not uncovered evidence that [false rumors] were spread as part of a concerted attempt by individuals to profit by manipulating the share price.” The FSA’s investigation included 40 staff reviewing transactions in HBOs shares in search of suspect trades, and also scrutinizing communications including internet message boards.

CONTINUE

Groundless Complaints

35. Lamont, June 28, 2006, op. cit., footnote 8.

36. Owen A. Lamont, “Go Down Fighting: Short Seller vs. Firms” (July 14, 2004). Yale ICF Working Paper No. 04-20. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=566901. See also: Owen A. Lamont, “Short Sale Constraints and Overpricing.” 2003. Available at: http://www.mba.yale.edu/faculty/pdf/overpricing.pdf

37. Owen A Lamont and Jeremy C. Stein, “Aggregate Short Interest and Market Valuations.” (December 2003). Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2027. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=569876

38.Financial Oversight of Enron: The SEC and Private-Sector Watchdogs. Report of the Staff to the Senate Committee of Governmental Affairs, October 8, 2002. Available at: http://hsgac.senate.gov/100702watchdogsreport.pdf

39. Financial Times, Sunday Telegraph, The Independent, and Reuters. Various reports August 2, 2008.

40. Brewster and Hughes, op. cit. footnote 12.

41. Lamont 2006, op. cit. footnote 34.

42. Alix Spiegel, “Short Selling: Profiting from Others’ Misery?” Morning Edition. NPR. July 18, 2008. Available at: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92664004

43. Comment letter to the SEC, August 15, 2008. Available at: http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/4-500/jjangel081505.pdf